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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this case of first impression we consider whether 18 
U.S.C. § 3147, which requires a sentence to be enhanced 
when the crime of conviction was committed while on pretrial 
release from another federal charge, allows a district court to 
impose a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum 
sentence for the underlying crime.  While some of our sister 
courts of appeals have also considered this issue, none has 
squarely decided it.  We also consider the defendant’s 
argument that the District Court erred in permitting him to be 
convicted of an offense under § 3147, rather than having it be 
considered as a sentencing enhancement.  
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Background 
 
Defendant Melvin Lewis (“Lewis”) was charged with 
one count of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 
(“Count One”), one count of possession of ammunition by a 
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (“Count 
Two”), and one count of committing an offense while on 
pretrial release, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3147(1) (“Count 
Three”).  The offense charged as Count Three reads as 
follows: 
 
A person convicted of an offense committed 
while released under this chapter shall be 
sentenced, in addition to the sentence prescribed 
for the offense to  
 
(1) a term of imprisonment of not more than 
ten years if the offense is a felony; or  
 
(2) a term of imprisonment of not more than 
one year if the offense is a misdemeanor.   
 
A term of imprisonment imposed under this 
section shall be consecutive to any other 
sentence of imprisonment. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3147.  In order to seek an enhancement under § 
3147, the government included it as a charged count so that it 
could “avoid any possible problem” at sentencing.  (App. 27.) 
 
Following a jury trial, Lewis was acquitted on Count 
One and convicted of Count Two.  After the jury returned its 
verdict as to Counts One and Two, the District Court 
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instructed the jury on Count Three.1
 
  The jury found both of 
its elements to be satisfied, and it returned a verdict of guilty 
on Count Three. 
The statutory maximum sentence for the underlying 
offense, possession of ammunition by a felon, was ten years.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (imposing a ten year maximum 
sentence on a conviction under § 922(g)(1)).  Thus, if § 3147 
is read to permit an additional ten years to be added to a 
defendant’s sentence, Lewis could receive a sentence of up to 
twenty years for the underlying crime, notwithstanding its ten 
year statutory maximum sentence, because he committed the 
offense while on release.   
                                              
1 The District Court instructed on Count Three as follows: 
 
In order to find Mr. Lewis guilty of this offense, you 
must find that the Government proved each of the 
following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
First: That Mr. Lewis was released under Title 18, 
United States Code Chapter 207, which means that he 
was released on bail after being charged with a federal 
crime.  And second: That while he was released, Mr. 
Lewis committed a federal offense while released.  
Because you have already found that Mr. Lewis was 
guilty on Count 2, you have found that he committed a 
federal offense.  However, you must now determine 
whether he committed this offense while on released 
status.  Here, the parties have stipulated that Mr. Lewis 
was on release under Title 18, Chapter 207 of the 
United States Code on January 9th, 2009.   
 
(App. 33.) 
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Under the Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), 
Lewis’ sentence was calculated as follows: The District Court 
applied § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (the applicable guideline for an 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) offense) to determine a base offense level 
of twenty.  Pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(6), the District Court 
added four levels because Lewis possessed ammunition in 
connection with another felony offense, i.e. carjacking.  Next, 
it added two levels pursuant to § 3C1.2 for reckless 
endangerment during flight.  Finally, the District Court 
applied § 3C1.3, the Guideline which implements § 3147, for 
the commission of an offense while on release, and added 
three levels.  Thus, the total offense level was twenty-nine.  
Lewis has a criminal history placing him within Category V.  
As such, the advisory sentencing range was 140 to 175 
months.  The District Court sentenced Lewis to 138 months’ 
imprisonment, comprised of two consecutive terms: 96 
months on Count Two and 42 months on Count Three.  The 
Court also imposed a three-year term of supervised release 
and ordered Lewis to pay a $1,000 fine and a $200 special 
assessment.   
 
Discussion 
 
The issue before us is unusual in that the Guidelines 
range, 140 to 175 months, exceeds the statutory maximum for 
the underlying offense, 120 months.  We are the first court to 
opine on the way in which § 3147 applies in this atypical fact 
setting.  Lewis contends that the District Court committed 
plain error because it imposed a sentence exceeding the 
statutory maximum for the underlying crime and treated § 
3147 as a separate offense.  The government disagrees, 
arguing that the plain language of § 3147 increases the 
statutory maximum for a felony by ten years if that felony 
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was committed while the defendant was on pretrial release for 
another federal charge, and whether treated as an offense of 
conviction or a sentencing enhancement, the ultimate effect is 
the same at sentencing, so any error in categorizing the statute 
as a basis for conviction is harmless.  The government 
concedes, however, that the special assessment should be 
reduced from $200 to $100 because § 3147 does not state a 
separate offense, but a sentencing enhancement. 
 
Before the District Court, Lewis raised no objection to 
his sentence exceeding the statutory maximum for the 
underlying crime, nor to being charged with, and convicted 
of, § 3147 as a crime under Count Three.  Accordingly, we 
review his challenge to the sentencing determination for plain 
error.  United States v. Couch, 291 F.3d 251, 252-53 (3d Cir. 
2002).  A sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum 
constitutes plain error.  United States v. Gunter, 527 F.3d 282, 
288 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 
2051 (2009).  We also review his challenge to his conviction 
on Count Three for plain error.  United States v. Tann, 577 
F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2009).2
 
  A conviction of an offense not 
authorized by Congress constitutes plain error.   Id. at 539-40.      
                                              
2 Plain error review requires us to first determine whether the 
District Court committed an error that is plain.  Second, we 
ask whether that error affected the defendant’s substantial 
rights.  Third, we must decide whether to exercise our 
discretion to correct that error, provided that the error 
seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.  Tann, 577 F.3d at 535. 
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Regarding the latter issue, it is fairly well established 
that § 3147 is a sentencing enhancement, not a crime.  See 
United States v. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 
1988) (holding that § 3147 is a sentencing enhancement and 
not a separate offense); see also United States v. Hecht, 212 
F.3d 847, 848 (3d Cir. 2000) (treating § 3147 as a sentencing 
enhancement); U.S.S.G. § 3C1.3 (referring to § 3147 as a 
sentencing enhancement).  Thus, as we discuss more fully 
below, it was plainly erroneous to convict Lewis on Count 
Three.  Apart from that, however, calling § 3147 an offense 
versus an enhancement may be a distinction without a real 
difference in determining its meaning and application, for 
those do not turn on the nomenclature.  The real issue before 
us is whether § 3147 can increase the statutory maximum 
sentence by adding ten years to the statutory maximum for 
the felony the defendant committed while on release.  We 
hold that it does, and that here, the 138-month sentence was 
properly imposed. 
 
We have previously found, and continue to find, that 
the language of § 3147 is clear and unambiguous.  See Di 
Pasquale, 864 F.2d at 280 (emphasizing that § 3147’s 
language is plain, and its meaning is clear).  Section 3147 
increases the maximum sentence allowed by statute for the 
underlying offense by ten years because it requires the 
sentencing judge to add a sentence of up to ten years “in 
addition to the sentence prescribed for the offense.”  Congress 
would not have written “in addition to the sentence 
prescribed” in the statute if it really meant that the § 3147 
enhancement should instead be imposed as a portion of the 
sentence of the underlying crime.  Furthermore, by specifying 
in the statute that the sentence “shall be consecutive to any 
other sentence of imprisonment,” Congress intended for the 
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sentencing court to impose an extra sentence on top of the one 
imposed for the underlying offense.  The statute contains no 
qualification or exception where adding up to ten years to the 
“sentence prescribed” would exceed the statutory maximum 
for the underlying offense.  It is difficult for us to read this 
language in any other manner; by its own terms, the provision 
states that a sentence of up to ten years shall be imposed “in 
addition to the sentence prescribed” for the underlying felony.    
 
Lewis points to the legislative history as indicating that 
Congress intended § 3147 to authorize adding up to ten years 
to a sentence for a felony conviction, as long as the total 
sentence remains within the statutory maximum for the 
underlying crime.  We must, however, begin with the 
statutory language and presume that Congress meant exactly 
what the language provides.  Where the statute is clear and 
unambiguous, the judicial inquiry is complete, and we will 
not consider statutory purpose or legislative history.  In re 
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 
2010); see also Price v. Del. State Police Fed. Credit Union, 
370 F.3d 362, 368 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We are to begin with the 
text of a provision and, if its meaning is clear, end there.”).  
Thus, we find no need to examine § 3147’s legislative 
history.3
                                              
3 Even if we did consider it, we would also find that the 
legislative history Lewis points to provides little support for 
his argument.  The Senate Report states that § 3147 
“prescribes a penalty in addition to any sentence ordered for 
the offense for which the defendant was on release.”  S. Rep. 
No. 98-225, at 34 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3217.  This sentence simply confirms what the text of 
the statute already provides: § 3147 allows an enhanced 
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Lewis next urges that § 3147 does not affect the 
statutory maximum because it is implemented through the 
Guidelines in such a way that limits the enhancement to only 
a portion of the sentence for the underlying offense.  He 
refers to § 3C1.3 of the Guidelines, which provides, “If a 
statutory sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 
applies, increase the offense level by 3 levels.”  The note to § 
3C1.3 explains:  
 
Under 18 U.S.C. 3147, a sentence of 
imprisonment must be imposed in addition to 
the sentence for the underlying offense, and the 
sentence of imprisonment imposed under 18 
U.S.C. 3147 must run consecutively to any 
other sentence of imprisonment. Therefore, the 
court, in order to comply with the statute, 
should divide the sentence on the judgment 
form between the sentence attributable to the 
underlying offense and the sentence attributable 
to the enhancement. The court will have to 
ensure that the “total punishment” (i.e., the 
                                                                                                     
sentence, in addition to the sentence the defendant may 
receive for the underlying offense and for the offense for 
which the defendant was on pretrial release.  Nor does the 
fact that an amendment to § 3147, which took effect after the 
Guidelines were promulgated, was intended to “eliminat[e] 
the mandatory nature of the penalties in favor of utilizing 
sentencing guidelines” make Lewis’ point.  Id. at 3369.  This 
only indicates that Congress wanted courts to take a more 
flexible and reasoned approach to sentencing under § 3147 
rather than simply applying its statutory maximum. 
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sentence for the offense committed while on 
release plus the statutory sentencing 
enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 3147) is in 
accord with the guideline range for the offense 
committed while on release, including, as in any 
other case in which a Chapter Three adjustment 
applies (see § 1B1.1 (Application Instructions)), 
the adjustment provided by the enhancement in 
this section. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.3 app. n.1.  Lewis reads this note to indicate 
that the § 3147 enhancement can never result in a sentence 
exceeding the statutory maximum prescribed for the 
underlying offense.  But it says no such thing.  The 
Guidelines’ explanation simply instructs the sentencing judge 
as to how to factor the § 3147 enhancement into her 
calculation so that she reaches a sentencing determination 
which is consistent with the Guidelines and accurately 
reflects compliance with § 3147.  The Guidelines make no 
reference to the statutory maximum sentence or any effect 
thereon when applying the enhancement.  Here, that statutory 
maximum increased from ten years to twenty years.  And the 
sentence the District Court arrived at, 138 months, is below 
the combined statutory maximum and is consistent with the 
Guidelines’ recommendation of 140 to 175 months.   
 
 Lewis urges us to consider decisions from other courts 
of appeals which, he contends, have concluded that when § 
3147 is applied, the sentence can never exceed the statutory 
maximum allowed for the underlying crime.  However, we 
view these opinions as either unpersuasive because the 
language he relies on is dicta, or, actually, supportive of our 
conclusion.   
11 
 
 United States v. Dison, 573 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 
2009) clearly involves dicta.  There, the defendant pleaded 
guilty to failure to appear in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146, an 
offense which carries a five-year maximum sentence.  At 
sentencing, the judge applied the § 3147 enhancement 
pursuant to § 3C1.3 of the Guidelines, and sentenced the 
defendant to twenty-one months’ imprisonment.  On appeal, 
the defendant argued that the § 3147 enhancement should not 
apply when the underlying crime is failure to appear, “which 
by definition can only be committed while on release.”  Id. at 
207.  The only issue before the court was whether, by its 
terms, § 3147 could apply to a § 3146 conviction.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the issue of serving a sentence 
that exceeded the statutory maximum for § 3146 was not 
before the court, after reaching its conclusion that § 3147 was 
clear and did apply, the court “continue[d] briefly” and 
volunteered that “regardless of the fact that § 3147 calls for 
punishment ‘in addition to the sentence prescribed’ for the 
underlying offense, the § 3147 enhancement can never result 
in a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum prescribed 
for the offense committed while on release . . . . ” Id. at 209.  
This conclusion by the court was clearly dicta and, we 
believe, was simply incorrect.   
 
 In United States v. Samuel, 296 F.3d 1169, 1170 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002), the sole issue before the court was whether failure 
to have a jury decide if the defendant was on release at the 
time he committed the underlying crime – the crux of a § 
3147 enhancement – ran afoul of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000), and foreclosed application of § 3147.  
The court noted that because the defendant never faced a 
sentence exceeding the statutory maximum for the underlying 
offense, the jury need not make a finding regarding § 3147.  
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Samuel, 296 F.3d at 1175.  By stating what the facts did not 
present, the court in Samuel actually suggested that if the 
defendant did face such a sentence, then a jury would need to 
make a finding under § 3147, which is exactly what happened 
here.  Notably, it did not state that a jury finding would never 
be required under § 3147 because it could not result in a 
sentence in excess of the statutory maximum for the 
underlying offense. 
 
Similarly, Lewis’ reliance on United States v. Randall, 
287 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2002), is misplaced.  In Randall, the 
defendant asserted an Apprendi violation because whether he 
committed an offense while on release was not submitted to 
the jury.  Id. at 29.  In rejecting the defendant’s claim, the 
court concluded that an enhancement under § 3C1.3 (and 
thus, § 3147) need not be submitted to the jury when there is 
no risk that the total sentence will exceed the statutory 
maximum for the underlying crime.  Id. at 30.  In so deciding, 
the court noted that “§ 3147 requires that a consecutive 
sentence be imposed – which could raise the maximum 
sentence by as much as ten years – if a defendant is found to 
have committed an offense while on pretrial release.”  Id. at 
29.  It also observed that  § 3147 “carried the potential for a 
ten-year increase” in the maximum sentence.  Id.  Thus, 
Samuel and Randall actually support the conclusion we reach 
by recognizing that § 3147 can add ten years to a defendant’s 
statutory maximum sentence. 
 
 The court in United States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143 
(2d Cir. 2008), shared this view, as well.  There, the 
defendant raised an Apprendi challenge to the application of § 
3147.  In finding no merit to his contention, the court noted 
that § 3147 exposes a defendant “to a higher maximum, i.e. 
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ten more years, than the highest maximum he could have 
received on the offense-on-release counts.”  Id. at 155.   
 
In short, in all of the cases discussed above, the facts 
were such that the defendant never really faced a risk of a 
sentence which exceeded the statutory maximum for the 
underlying crime.  In this case, Lewis does.  Given these 
circumstances, we conclude that the statutory language of § 
3147 is controlling and hold that, according to its plain 
language, § 3147 can increase the statutory maximum 
sentence for the underlying felony offense committed while 
on pretrial release by ten years.   
 
 We noted above that the nomenclature – whether a 
separate crime versus a sentencing enhancement – makes 
little difference in terms of our interpretation of § 3147.  
However, one distinction is clear.  A jury must decide 
whether the elements of a separate crime have been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury did so find here in 
convicting Lewis of Count Three.  With the usual sentencing 
enhancement that is not the case: the court is free to enhance 
the sentence without any findings from the jury.  However, 
where the enhancement would result in a sentence that 
exceeds the statutory maximum for the crime, as here, it is not 
merely the “usual” enhancement.  Instead, as Apprendi 
teaches, when a sentencing enhancement would increase the 
maximum sentence to which a defendant is to be exposed, it 
must be submitted to the jury and its elements proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (“Other 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the 
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”).  The error in treating § 3147 as an offense, here, 
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turned out to be a wise move from an Apprendi standpoint, as 
the jury found that the elements of § 3147 had been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, thus allowing the judge to impose 
a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum sentence for 
the underlying crime.4
 
  Therefore, the District Court 
committed no error in sentencing Lewis to 138 months’ 
imprisonment.   
As we noted above, however, because § 3147 is not a 
separate offense, but a sentencing enhancement, Lewis’ 
conviction on Count Three was plainly erroneous and cannot 
stand.  See Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d at 280.  Furthermore, 
Lewis’ conviction on Count Three affected his substantial 
rights.  It is of no matter that the conviction on Count Three 
did not affect the Guidelines calculation; a separate 
conviction for a crime that does not exist “has potential 
adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored.”  
Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985).  Such 
collateral consequences may include an increased sentence 
                                              
4 We have previously suggested ways in which the district 
courts can satisfy the requirements of Apprendi.  “Since 
Apprendi, federal and state courts have relied upon jury 
interrogatories or relied upon a bifurcated trial to establish 
facts relevant to certain sentencing enhancements under the 
advisory Guidelines.”  United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 
612 n.58 (3d Cir. 2007).  These methods do not call for the 
enhancement to be charged in the indictment.  However, as 
counsel for the government acknowledged at argument in this 
case, a common method for putting a defendant on notice of 
his exposure to an enhancement is to note the potential 
enhancement in the count or counts to which it may apply, 
here, the underlying crime. 
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under a recidivist statute, additional societal stigma, and, at 
the very least, an additional $100 special assessment.  See id.; 
see also Tann, 577 F.3d at 539 (viewing an extra $100 special 
assessment as an adverse consequence of an unlawful 
conviction); United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 73-74 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (same). 
 
Furthermore, the conviction on Count Three “seriously 
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings,” since, as we concluded in Tann, any additional 
unauthorized conviction and its accompanying special 
assessment, coupled with potential adverse collateral 
consequences, seriously calls into question the fairness and 
integrity of judicial proceedings.  Tann, 577 F.3d at 543.   
 
  We will remand the case to the District Court with 
instructions to vacate the conviction and the $100 special 
assessment on Count Three, and to revise the judgment 
accordingly to reflect two consecutive terms of imprisonment: 
a term for Count Two and a term pursuant to § 3147.  If the 
District Court concludes that it would sentence Lewis to a 
different term of imprisonment in light of our holding – 
namely, that his conviction should have been for one crime 
rather than two, and that § 3147 should be treated as a 
sentencing enhancement, not a separate offense – it may do 
so.5
                                              
5 The conviction on Count Three did not, in and of itself, have 
an impact on the Guidelines’ calculation because the District 
Court started with the base offense level applicable only to 
Count Two.  Because § 3147 applied, it then added three 
levels pursuant to § 3C1.3.  Thus, the District Court’s 
calculation is consistent with treating § 3147 as an 
  If not, his sentence of 138 months’ imprisonment shall 
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stand.  In all other respects, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
                                                                                                     
enhancement rather than a separate offense.  Nonetheless, if 
the District Court, in deciding the proper sentence, was 
impacted by the fact that Lewis was convicted of two counts 
rather than one, and now wishes to impose a different term of 
imprisonment, we would permit this on remand.   
